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Improving Memory and Mood Through
Automatic and Controlled Procedures of
Mind
Paula T. Hertel

Memory procedures and emotional states function together. Affective tone
permeates episodes of memory functioning. Memory functions centrally in
episodes of emotional disturbance, serving to feed the episode with fuel from
past events or to repress those events when one hopes to escape or avoid the
episode. When cognitive procedures are impaired by emotional states such as
depression and anxiety, people do not perform the tasks and achieve the goals
that could help to repair their moods. In the context of these considerations,
then, we must view the improvement of memory as not merely a possible
outcome of change in emotional states, but as a factor in effecting such
change. Memory improvement and mood improvement function together.
In this chapter, I examine the relationship between memory functions and
the negatively valenced emotional states of anxiety and depression. lsen
(1984), Bower (1981), and others have discussed the relation of positively
valenced states to memory, showing that a positive mood improves intentional
memory for positive and sometimes neutral events. However, in a very
practical sense, knowing that one can sometimes remember better in a good
mood is trivial to the goal of memory improvement; the problem becomes one
of trying to attain the good mood. Also, people in elated states don't care very
much about possible memory difficulties that arise from extreme arousal or
from attempts to recall negative events. In contrast, people care a great deal
about impaired functions associated with depression and anxiety (Beck, Rush,
Shaw, & Emery, 1979; Poon, 1980). Furthermore, our knowledge of angry
memory is limited, and it would seem to be a transitory phenomenon unless
anger is accompanied by depression. These are the reasons for restricting my
topic to depressive and anxiety-related phenomena in memory. The central
goals in improving the memory functions of depressed and anxious people are
restoration to nonna/ levels and eventual mood repair.
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This chapter is organized according to the considerations noted at the outset.
The first section briefly reviews the major findings in the literature on memory
impairment associated with depression and anxiety. The emphasis is placed on
findings that offer interesting implications for memory improvement. The
second section pertains to memory improvement during mood impairment.
Improving one's memory provides a reduction in the number of things one
must feel depressed or anxious about. It also helps to achieve more important
goals that might eventually assist in mood repair. The third section talces up
the bidirectional relation of memory functioning and disturbed mood. In this
section, I review the literature on cognitive biases associated with depression
and anxiety, with an eye toward their alleviation. The third section is based on
the assumptions that the best way to improve memory functioning is to repair
the disturbed mood and that such repair involves important adjustments in
memory procedures.
The literatures on mood-related effects in memory are guided by various
theoretical perspectives (e.g., schema theory, network theory). Following the
lead of others (e.g., Clark & lsen, 1982; Eysenck, 1982; Hasher & Zacks,
1979), I appeal to the theoretical distinction between automatic and controlled
processes in order to establish a framework for this review. In the manner
outlined by Kahneman (1973), I refer to procedures that can occur without
attention or conscious awareness as automatic processes. Controlled processes
are those that require attention or the use of resources that are essentially
limited by a relatively fixed capacity for conscious thought. An emphasis on
specific cognitive procedures holds the greatest promise for research on
memory improvement (see Herrmann & Searleman, 1990).

Memory Impairment in Depressed and Anxious States

populations (experimental inductions, dysphoric college students, outpatients
with depressive symptoms and syndromes, and hospitalized depressives with
and without other nosologies) and different types of anxious populations
(students with test, state, or trait anxiety; phobics; and patients and students
with other anxiety-related disorders). In my discussions of depressive and
anxiety-related phenomena, I ignore possible differences associated with the
type of population unless those differences have contributed to a reliable
taxonomy of corresponding effects on memory functioning. For the most part,
this has not been the case (cf., Ingram & Kendall, 1987; Williams, Watts,
MacLeod, & Mathews, 1988).

Depressive Deficits
A number of reviews of depressive deficits in memory conclude that
depression is associated with a reduction in effortful or controlled processing
within a limited capacity system (e.g., Ellis, & Ashbrook, 1988; Williams et al.,
1988). According to this view, depression depletes the resources needed to
perform more difficult processing tasks. Depletion occurs through
physiological limitations on processing capacity or through the allocation of
attention to irrelevant features of self or context (Beck, 1967; Ellis &
Ashbrook, 1988). Depressed subjects in memory experiments, then,
presumably have limited ability to employ controlled processes such as
organization and elaboration--processes that require attention within the
limited capacity system (see Hasher & Zacks, 1979) and benefit subsequent
attempts to remember.
Within this general framework of depressive deficits in controlled processing,
some research has emphasized the organization (or the structure) of the
materials to be remembered. Williams et al. (1988) and Ellis and Ashbrook

Many reviews of mood and memory emphasize research on the association of
mood with the emotional meaning of the materials or events to be
remembered (i.e., mood congruence; e.g., Blaney, 1986; Ingram, 1984; Isen,
1984; Johnson & Magaro, 1987). I briefly address issues related to mood
congruence below, where I take up the interrelation between mood and

(1988) have suggested that well structured or organized materials make fewer
processing demands. Recall of clearly structured prose passages like those
used by Hasher, Rose, Zacks, Sanft, and Doren (1985) does not refle.ct
depressive deficits, whereas recall of more obtuse text does (see Watts &
Cooper, 1989). As early as 1976, Russell and Beekhuis showed that the ability

memory improvement. Here I review research on memory impairment when
depressed or anxious subjects encounter relatively neutral information.
Relatively neutral materials probably constitute a large portion of what one
encounters in occupational or educational settings.
Although symptoms of depression and anxiety correlate highly in some
populations, there are potentially important differences in their effects on
memory functions (Ingram, Kendall, Smith, Donnell, & Ronan, 1987).
Unfortunately, few researchers have taken measures of both types of affect,
so the similarities and differences in the findings on depression and anxiety
should be viewed with caution (see Greenberg & Beck, 1989). Furthermore,
the findings I review are gathered from different types of depressive

to sort nouns into obvious categories during the learning task was not
impaired by psychotic depression. Depressed patients in studies by
Weingartner, Cohen, Murphy, Martello, and Gerdt (1981) showed recall
deficits with unstructured word lists but not when the lists were clearly
categorized. So in the sense of inherent structure of materials to be
remembered, depressive deficits occur with poorly structured materials.
Accounts of depressive deficits that emphasize depletions in resources tend to
maintain that depressed subjects lack the resources to detect or to impose the
structure that will benefit later recall.
Other specifications of impaired processing point to deficits in elaborative
processing. Roy-Byrne, Weingartner, Bierer, Thompson, and Post (1986)
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found depressive deficits in recalling elaborated materials from a semantic
orienting task but no deficit in frequency judgments, which are often not
affected by elaborative processing.
Ellis, Thomas, and Rodriguez (1984, Experiment 1) showed that college
students who were experimentally induced to feel depressed did not recall
words that were each studied in elaborated sentences as well as did neutral
subjects; perhaps they failed to expend the resources needed to fully process
the elaborated contexts or to use them at the time of recall (see Ellis,
Thomas, McFarland, & Lane, 1985). In another experiment that employed
induction procedures, Ellis et al. (1984, Experiment 3) showed a depressive
deficit in recall of words placed in contextually difficult (less obvious)
sentences but not in recall of words from sentences that were highly related
to the words. Hertel and Rude (1991b) failed to replicate these findings with
naturally depressed college students. (Also see Hasher et al., 1985; Ingram,
1989; Isen, 1984; for discussions of possible differences in memory effects
associated with naturally occurring versus experimentally induced depression.)
Recently, however, we have replicated the findings of Ellis et al. (1984,
Experiment 3) with clinically depressed outpatients. The results of this
experiment suggest modifications to previous speculations about the nature of
depressive deficits in controlled processing.
In the incidental learning phase of an experiment by Hertel and Rude
(1991a), outpatients exhibiting symptoms of unipolar depression, recovered
outpatients, and nonpsychiatric controls judged the semantic fit of words into
easy or difficult sentence frames. One learning condition was similar to the
procedure of Ellis et al. (1984, Experiment 3): The word and the frame were
displayed concomitantly, and subjects judged the fit whenever they chose to
do so during the duration of the trial. Another condition restricted the display
of the word to 1 second at the beginning of the trial; subjects were required
to repeat the word and make the judgment at the end of the trial. In this
second condition, then, the subjects' attention was focused on the task, in that
they were required to rehearse the words and possibly encouraged to process
them more elaboratively in the context of the sentence, whereas in the
unfocused condition, subjects' attention was less constrained to focus on the
task. The unfocused condition produced a depressive deficit in the subsequent
free recall of words from the difficult contexts. In contrast, depressed subjects
in the focused learning condition recalled those words as well as did both
control groups.
Clearly, these results suggest that depression does not limit the ability to
allocate sufficient resources to a more difficult task. Yet an emphasis on
controlled processes is still quite appropriate: When the task was unfocused,
depressed subjects might have paid less attention to the materials; perhaps
they allocated attention to task irrelevant processing. However, under focused
learning conditions that were at least as demanding, depressed subjects
performed as capably as nondepressed subjects. Hertel and Hardin (1990)
describe deficits of the type that was demonstrated in the unfocused condition
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as depressive deficits in initiative. Unlike subjects in a neutral mood,
depressed subjects fail to spontaneously initiate controlled processes that
would benefit intentional remembering. When procedures are guided by
instructions or when tests of memory bypass the advantage of uninstructed
procedures employed spontaneously by nondepressed subjects, initiative ceases
to be the issue and depressed subjects do not show memory impairments.
Deficits in initiative might be understood as difficulties in detecting the
optimal strategy. Experiments by Leight and EJtis {1981), conducted with
experimental inductions of depressive and neutral moods, have shown
depressive impairments in the discovery of higher order structure for letter
strings. In the varied-input condition, the learning task encouraged but did not
instruct for the discovery of higher order meaning. In the constant-input
condition, such discovery was made more difficult. Following the learning
phase, subjects were transferred to a similar task with new letter strings, under
either varied or constant conditions. The important result for the present
purposes was that nondepressed subjects who received varied input on the
learning task detected the higher order meaning and transferred that strategy
to the second task, regardless of their mood or the conditions of input during
the second task. A depressed mood prevented the detection of the optimal
strategy, but once it had been discovered under neutral conditions, depressed
subjects used the strategy effectively.
Depressive deficits in initiative might also be understood as motivational
disturbances. Experimentally depressed subjects tend to report less curiosity
and are less motivated to read about psychology experiments (Rodrigue,
Olson, & Markley, 1987). Riskind (1989) suggested that reduced interest in
external events might even cause a reduction in the allocation of resources to
cognitive tasks. Along these lines, Cohen, Weingartner, Smallberg, Pickar, and
Murphy (1982) obtained a high correlation between sustained motor effort
and recall at longer delays in a short-term memory task (for depressed
subjects only). Because these tasks share few elements, the authors suggested
that they are related through a central motivational state. Such a central
mechanism could also determine the tendency to initiate strategies beyond the
requirements of the task.
Retarded initiation of voluntary action is emphasized by Coyne and Gotlib's
(1983) review of depression research. Similarly, Rehm (1982) related loss of
initiative to deficits in self-monitoring and self-control. Retarded initiative,
however, does not imply that depressed subjects simply suffer from low levels
of arousal or lack incentives. Several investigators provide evidence that
depressed people are ultimately very cooperative (Coyne & Gotlib, 1983), that
simple manipulations of incentive do not affect depressed subjects more than
others (Richards & Ruff, 1989), and that CNS arousal characterizes
depression (e.g., Kuhl & Helle, 1986). Clearly, the relation between depression
and specific motivational constructs has not been well delineated.
Kuhl and Helle (1986) have developed an interesting approach to
understanding the cooccurrence of central arousal and behavioral passivity in
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depression. They proposed that chronic depression is maintained by
unfulfillable (degenerated) intentions. Intentions to achieve essentially
unattainable goals use resources needed to enact new intentions. Thus, to the
extent that they are "on one's mind," they induce arousal while ensuring
passivity in ongoing tasks. One test of this account established a very minor
unfulfillable goal (cleaning up a messy table) that, for depressed subjects only,
seemed to remain active during subsequent tests of prospective memory
(remembering to number pages) and memory span for words. Kuhl and
Helle's work is compatible with the notion that ruminations occupy the
cognitive capacity needed for ongoing tasks, but the ruminations are not
necessarily self-related, and they interfere with the initiation of new tasks as
well as with routine processing demands.
Finally, Watts, MacLeod, and Morris (1988b) suggest that the depressive
mind is not always actively engaged in task irrelevant thoughts when deficits
are observed in memory tasks. Mind wandering seems to occur during prose
processing or retrieval, but when depressed subjects are engaged in planning
during problem solving (e.g., the Tower of Hanoi) the mind "goes blank."
Going blank seems to reflect difficulties in thinking about what to do next.

Anxiety-Related Deficits
In reviewing research on anxiety-related deficits in memory functions, Eysenck
(1982) and Wine (1980) offered interpretations that emphasized attentional
capacity. As in the hypothesis with depressive deficits, capacity is presumably
occupied by extra-task processing. Unlike accounts of depressive deficits,
however, Eysenck proposed that anxious subjects attempt to compensate with
increased effort; they do better at easy tasks, while still showing the deficit in
difficult tasks. Thus, anxiety reduces the reserve of resources for controlled
processing, with arousal mediating the effects related to task difficulty.
Moreover, arousal seems to have consequences for cue utilization
(Easterbrook, 1959). Task irrelevant cues are eliminated by moderate levels
of arousal, but higher levels seem also to eliminate more central, relevant cues
(see Geen," 1980, for a review of cue utilization in test anxiety).
A particularly good summary of evidence of anxiety-related deficits in
memory is provided by Williams et al. (1988, Ch. 3). Such deficits involve
impaired elaboration, referred to by Williams et al. as biases toward surface
level processing. Anxiety also seems to reduce the use of organizational
processes, but such reduction sometimes is compensated for by other means.
For example, Mueller (1976) has shown evidence of less clustering by anxious
students without an overall deficit in free recall.
In general, anxiety-related deficits occur under conditions that are widely
similar to those in which depressive deficits arise. Impaired elaborative and
organizational processes are associated with susceptibility to sources of
distraction that use resources within a limited capacity system. Ingram and
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Kendall (1987) suggested that anxious subjects' task irrelevant focus is less
self-oriented than what seems to be the case with depressives, but when the
overlap between depression and anxiety is eliminated, so is the evidence for
differences in self-focus (Ingram, 1990). Some anxious subjects, however, do
show signs of excessive preoccupation with stressful situations and misperceive
their demands (Ingram et al., 1987). They sometimes compensate by
increasing their efforts on aspects of the task that are under their control
(easier tasks that benefit from high levels of arousal).
rmally, it might be important to consider that almost all demonstrations of
mood-related impairments have used tests of intentional remembering (see
Jacoby & Kelley, 1987). As has been found by Hertel and Hardin (1990), with
depressed college students, mood impairments may not occur on tests where
remembering is not the focus of attention but, instead, may occur in the
course of performing other tasks. (Mood congruency, however, has been
demonstrated in such tasks; these effects are described below.) Moreover,
unintentional uses of memory clearly outdistance intentional uses of memory
in their frequency and importance of occurrence. The irony of this observation
lies in the realization that mood-impaired people are not aware that
unintentional uses of memory may be unimpaired. They notice failures to
remember when they are trying to remember. An important step in future
research on memory impairment and complaints should be taken in the
direction of exploring unintentional uses of memory by depressed and anxious
people.

Memory Improvement During Mood Impairment

In their multimodal approach to suggestions for memory improvement,
Herrmann and Searleman (1990) made distinctions between "content"
manipulations, such as standard mnemonic techniques, and "process"
manipulations, such as changes in emotional states. According to their view,
process manipulations in the realm of depressive and anxiety-related deficits
are somewhat synonymous with mood improvement (addressed in the next
major section of this chapter). Evidence of mood dependent memory, also
taken up briefly by Herrmann and Searleman, is mixed in the realm of
depression and anxiety. Some researchers see mood dependent memory as a
special case of mood congruency (e.g., Blaney, 1986); others doubt its
existence or stress that it occurs only when other contextual cues are weak
(e.g., Bower & Mayer, 1989). Even if mood dependent memory turns out
eventually to be a reliable phenomenon, we might wonder what it offers in the
way· of memory improvement techniques, beyond instructions to make one's
mood during study comparable to one's mood during testing, or vice versa. In
this section, then, I restrict my review to research on memory improvement
in the realm of content and strategy manipulations used with depressed and
anxious subjects. The aim is to find ways of improving memory performance
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was true for the depressed outpatients, who showed a "distraction effect"

to be used by people experiencing ongoing impaired moods.
The major question that arises in considering memory improvement
techniques for depressed and anxious people is whether such improvement

under low loads and recalled at higher levels as load increased. Ruminations
apparently can be overridden by attention-demanding tasks.

indeed is possible without mood repair. For example, after reviewing the

Attention-demanding tasks, of course, do not necessarily mobilize attention

evidence for depressive deficits in cognitive capacity, Williams et al. (1988,

in ways that benefit memory performance. Many tasks are susceptible to the

Chapter 3) wondered if depressed subjects are able to process "deeply;" some

use of special strategies that are not specified by instructions. Hertel and

clinical studies have shown that depressives benefitted less than normals from

Hardin (1990), for example, emphasized the importance of guiding depressed

inherent structure (i.e., the approximation of word lists to text). The

subjects in their use of controlled strategies for recognition. In these

implication is that depressed and anxious people should be resigned to

experiments, experimentally depressed, naturally depressed, and nondepressed

function on low capacity as best they can. However, research that has focused

college students completed two different tests of memory fo� homophones

on structuring not the materials but the task itself, through instructions and

whose less frequent meanings (e.g., pear instead of pair) had been biased in

design, holds more promise for believing that people with impaired moods can

an incidental study phase. In the first test of memory (spelling), the number

engage the procedures that lead to good performance on memory tests. The

of homophones spelled in line with the studied bias indexed the unintentional

advice that emerges from this research, described next, is to understand

use of memory and did not show a depressive deficit. Tests of unintentional

componentially the requirements of tasks to be completed by mood-impaired

uses of memory typically do not show effects of elaborative learning or invite

people, to construct methods for engaging the necessary procedures, and

strategic procedures during testing, and so nondepressed subjects should not

above all, not to abandon them to the weaknesses of their own initiative or to

show the advantage of initiating unrequired ·procedures. Tests of intentional

their irrelevant thoughts.

remembering, such as recognition, are susceptible to uninstructed procedures,
and on the following test of recognizing homophones from the study phase,
depressive deficits were revealed. Specifically, nondepressed subjects tended
to use strategies for recognition that employed the intervening spelling test,

Specific Procedures for Memory Improvement

whereas recognition and spelling were stochastically independent for depressed
subjects. Most important for research on memory improvement were the

Because disturbances in the focus of attention characterize both types of mood

results from attempts to provide all subjects with strategies that might have

impairments, it makes sense that there have been several successful attempts

been employed spontaneously by nondepressed subjects. When they were

to improve memory by mobilizing the attention of depressed and anxious

directed to recall the study phase as they spelled (Experiment

subjects for task appropriate processing. The evidence described above

their performance on the spelling test as a bridge to the study phase during

regarding the elimination of depressive deficits in recall by requiring attention

recognition (Experiment 3), the recognition performance of depressed subjects

to the target words during incidental learning (Hertel & Rude, 1991a) is one
example of such an attempt. Instructions to image during initial exposure to
materials is yet another way. If subjects cooperate, imagery improves memory
by way of both elaborative and organizational procedures. According to Watts,
MacLeod, and Morris (1988a), imagery instructions improved severely
depressed subjects' memory for prose, even though they still reported losses
of concentration. Edmunson

and Nelson (1976) showed

that

imagery

instructions helped highly anxious students (as well as nonanxious students).
In general, reviews of attempts to improve the performance of test anxious
students on memory tasks (e.g., Geen, 1980) emphasize the importance of
directing attention to task relevant features and away from sources of
distraction.
Directing attention away from sources of distraction experienced by
depressed people can be achieved by increasing task demands. Krames and
MacDonald (1985) obtained this result in a dual-processing task with varying
degrees of cognitive load. Nondepressed subjects recalled more words from
the beginning of lists under low loads than under high loads, but the reverse

2)

or to use

improved.
The investigation of impairments in strategic processing has been the focus
of research on problem solving in depression. Silberman, Weingartner, and
Post (1983) found that depressed subjects focused less on a single hypothesis
than did nondepressed subjects and solved fewer problems. Yet, when they
were required .to list their hypotheses while solving, depressed subjects
improved. Similarly, Abramson, Alloy, and Rosoff (1981) discovered that when
depressed subjects were provided with hypotheses for problem solving, they
performed as well as normals.
In summary, we might conclude that depressed people can be helped to
perform well on tests of intentional remembering if they are required to
attend to task relevant features and guided to employ appropriate strategies.
Although anxious people probably do not suffer from the lack of initiative,
they nevertheless need help in focusing on the relevant features of the task.
One might surmise from the comments of Ingram and Kendall (1987) and
Wine (1980) that anxious people would also profit from specifications of
strategies for unstructured situations. Yet, what can be done more generally
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in memory-training programs to encourage depressed and anxious people to
develop skills for use beyond the task at hand?

Memory Training
According to Williams el al. (1988, Ch. 3), there have been few, if any,
demonstrations of long-term instructional effects for depression and anxiety.
Poon (1980) outlined a multifaceted program that includes specific suggestions
for practicing learning strategies and for developing retrieval plans. Yet, as
Watts et al. (1988a) aptly comment, "the main challenge is likely to be getting
[depressed people] to actually use the strategies" (p. 187). No one (depressed,
anxious, or "normal" people alike) likes to use the effortful, controlled
procedures that typify memory improvement techniques. Indeed, Poon's
.
program includes many motivational components to encoura�e practice.
Long-term improvement in the real world also depends heavily on what one
might call "prospective metamemory." Practiced and skilled we may be, but we
still must consciously remember to use the techniques, at least until they
become automatic or habitual. Prospective metamemory might be best
achieved if training and practice take place in a variety of settings and tasks
so that cues to use the procedures are linked to the situations in which they
are needed.
Finally, it seems likely that a stable of mnemonic and search techniques
might not be the thing to emphasize in training programs with depressed and
anxious people. What seems to be particularly necessary is practice at staying
on task, perhaps assisted by external aids. Training in breaking down the
components of cognitive tasks might help to override depressive deficits in
initiative and planning. In this regard, main-line research on memory might
do well to emphasize specific procedures of mind (Kolers & Roediger, 1984).
Functional approaches, such as the description of relations among classes of
cues (Watkins, 1990), offer direct application to memory training.
Any program designed to improve memory functions in the long run must
also consider factors beyond training in specific skills and strategies (Poon,
1980). For example, a reduced sense of self-efficacy in cognitive tasks is
associated with depressed moods (Bower, 1983) and test anxiety (Wine, 1980).
Self-efficacy determines what one attempts to do and how well one persists in
doing it (Bandura, 1977). Therefore, training in self-efficacy--through
experience in structured tasks--might help to improve performance on
unstructured memory tasks (also see Hertzog, this volume). In addition, Kuhl
and Helle (1986) advised that we teach depressed people strategies for
disregarding intentions unrelated to the task at hand.

Improvement in Mood and Memory

Improvement in memory functioning of mood-impaired people seems best
achieved by repairing the disturbed moods. Does mood repair actually help?
Our assumption that it does relies on evidence that mood-impaired subjects
do not perform as well as others. Most of these studies are correlational; even
in the ones that employ experimental inductions, some other phenomenon
associated with the induced mood may actually cause the deficit (see Riskind,
1989). What is needed is research in which mood-impaired subjects are
randomly assigned to treatments for mood repair or to wait lists, with a
demonstration of pretreatment deficits and posttreatment recovery.
If mood repair does improve memory performance, the method of treatment
seems to be critical. For example, remediation of memory difficulties
associated with test anxiety has not been achieved reliably by treating the
emotional component of anxiety through relaxation techniques (see Williams
et al., 1988, Ch. 3; Wine, 1980). Furthermore, one cannot repair mood
disturbances without involving memory functions. The success of attempts at
mood repair is clearly affected by ongoing memory procedures such as mood
congruent attention and retrieval.
Selective attention to mood congruent aspects of current experience and
selective remembering of mood congruent aspects of events from the past
constitute ubiquitous findings in the literature on mood and memory (see
reviews by Blaney, 1986; Bower, 1981; lsen, 1984; Johnson & Magaro, 1987).
However, the selectivity of these procedures is commonly thought to be an
automatic aspect of feeling state, with controlled processes operating on the
material that is automatically selected for attention (Clark & Isen, 1982; but
see the superb critique by Blaney, 1986). Mood is presumably maintained by
automatic selection and repaired by controlled processes. Sometimes
controlled processe s such as active rehearsal of mood-related materials are
thought to operate in such a way as to reconcile their meaning and achieve
self-control (e.g., Rehm, 1982); sometimes controlled processes direct
attention away from further processing and toward more neutral material.
Next, I describe a few examples of mood congruent effects that illustrate these
proposed phenomena.
In the realm of automatic selection, several studies (reviewed by Williams
et al., 1988, Ch. 10) have shown selective attention to threat-related words by
anxious subjects. Also, Eysenck, MacLeod, and Mathews (1987), for example,
showed that trait anxious subjects spelled homophones in the direction of
threat-related meaning (e.g., die vs. dye). Similar effects have been found in
depression; for example, a depressed mood has been associated with lowered
thresholds for detecting failure-related words (Postman & Brown, 1952) and
emotional words in general (Small & Robins, 1988). Yet, according to
Williams et al., depressive effects in automatic selection have not been
demonstrated when anxiety is controlled.
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Automatic retrieval processes, to the extent to which they characterize
procedures in tests of unintentional memory, also are implicated in anxiety.
Subjects in a study by Mathews, Mogg, May, and Eysenck

(1989)

were asked

Such awareness might not directly modify the state, but it could provide
opportunities for

the counterconditioning of emotional processes. For

example, if threatening stimuli are not avoided, reactions other than fear

can

to imagine scenes for threatening and nonthreatening words and to judge their

be conditioned and erroneous ideas about threat can be challenged (see Foa

pleasantness. Later they were provided with three-letter stems for old and new

& Kozak,

words and told to complete them with the first word that came to mind.

concentrating attention on "automatic" negatively valenced thoughts, depressed

Subjects with generalized anxiety disorders completed the stems of old

people could then redirect resources to more productive focal points and

threatening words more often than other types and more often than did

those procedures might become more automatic with practice.

1986).

A similar point is made by Beck et al.

(1979):

By

however,

More generally, cognitive therapies have been shown to be effective in the

anxiety-related differences were not obtained. Furthermore, others cited by

treatment of depression (e.g., Teasdale, Fennell, Hibbert, & Amies, 1984) and

controls.

In

the

controlled-processing

test

of

cued

recall,

1980).

Mathews et al. have found that anxious subjects actually recall fewer

the "worry" component of anxiety (Wine,

threatening than nonthreatening words. Perhaps controlled processes operate

techniques of cognitive restructuring of depressive or worrisome thoughts.

to avoid further processing of threatening materials.

Teasdale

Illustrations of mood congruent effects on intentional recall abound.

(1983)

Cognitive therapies include

tells us that cognitive therapy helps the client to gain access

to more realistic thoughts; such access can be attained through the guidance

Symmetries with respect to depression and anxiety are most often found when

of thoughts or the improvement of mood, which provides automatic access to

materials have been processed self-referentially (e.g., Greenberg & Beck,

positive thoughts. The processes involved in restructuring might well involve

1989; Ingram

redirecting resources to more productive thoughts in both conscious and

et al.,

1987).

Such symmetries led Ingram and Kendall

(1987)

to suggest that anxious and depressed subjects engage similar procedures, with

unconscious ways (Williams et al., 1988, Chapter

10).

the products of the procedures exhibiting differences associated with the type
of mood. Others might point out that controlled procedures operate to
different ends, as a consequence of motivational factors such as avoidance (in

Conclusions

anxiety) or mood repair (in depression). We can reasonably assume that
controlled procedures would be involved in attempts at mood control. Such
attempts would not always be important in typical experimental contexts (and
therefore symmetries between depression and anxiety can be demonstrated),
but they would more likely arise in natural contexts for retrieving personal
memories (see Costanzo & Hasher,

1989).

A framework for reconciling the sometimes disparate findings on mood
congruency has been offered by Williams et al.

(1988,

Chapter

10).

Their

model holds that depression and anxiety involve different types of biases in
specific procedures that are either passive (automatic) or awareness based
(controlled). Anxiety operates like automatic priming in moving resources
toward threatening materials. Later, awareness-based procedures direct
resources away from threatening materials, thereby inhibiting the development
of cues for recall. In contrast, depression biases the products of controlled
processes by deploying resources to the recruitment of depression-related
information. The model provides links to certain notions of adaptation:
Anxiety helps people to avoid danger, so automatic aspects of information
processing are sensitive to anxiety; one function of depression is to come to
terms with loss, so controlled procedures are sensitive to depression.
Based on their model, Williams et al.

(1988)

provide some suggestions for

remediation of impaired mood. Treatments that emphasize positive aspects of
experience can, through rehearsal, make them more likely to be automatically
selected. Furthermore, treatment may help mood-impaired people to become
aware of the ways that automatic processes contribute to their mood states.

In reviewing what we have learned to date about memory improvement,
Herrmann and Searleman

(1990)

reached three conclusions. First, people will

not continue to use very effortful techniques. According to some formulations,
the use of such techniques by depressed and anxious people is inherently
limited by their moods. Alternatively, my review has led to the conclusion that
the attention of depressed and anxious people can be mustered for effortful
processing by structuring the requirements of the task. This capability,
however,

does

not

obviate

the

problems

associated

with

long-term

improvement in intentional remembering. Some remediation might be
achieved through training in prospective metamemory, which would require
a clearer understanding of functional aspects of memory.
Functional

analyses

emphasize

specific

aspects

of

the

task

under

consideration. Similarly, Herrmann and Searleman's (1990) second conclusion
was that memory training should focus on skills that are specific to the
materials and task at hand. The notion of specificity should also be extended
to the domain of mood-related impairments, such as difficulties in planning
and in attending to task-related cues.
Third, the focus of memory training should be "multimodal." One of the
modes addressed by Herrmann and Searleman

(1990)

is the emotional state

of the rememberer. The authors suggest that various modes operate in ways
that are both central and peripheral to the memory system. This observation
clearly holds for depressive and anxious memory. Impaired moods perhaps
function peripherally to affect motivations associated with planning and task
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initiation. Impaired moods function centrally to channel the focus of attention,

sometimes away from the task and sometimes toward mood-related aspects

of experience. The distribution of resources to mood-related material may

function to maintain the mood and associated memory problems, but it can
be used therapeutically to repair the mood by summoning controlled processes

in situations where automatic processes typically hold sway.

Gaining control seems to be what memory training is all about. In contrast,

Clark, M.S., & lsen, A.M. (1982). Toward understanding the relationship
between feeling states and social behavior. In A.H. Hastorf & A.M. Isen

(Eds.), Cognitive social psychology (pp. 73-108). New York: Elsevier.

Cohen, R.M, Weingartner, H., Smallberg, SA., Pickar, D., & Murphy, D.L.

(1982). Effort and cognition in depression. Archives of General Psychiatry,
39, 593-597.
Costanzo, P.R., & Hasher, L. (1989). Mood and memory: A reconsideration.

losing control by practicing to make effortful procedures automatic (Klatzky,

In D. Kuiken (Ed.), Mood and memory: Theory, research, and applications

out to be better advice to give depressed and anxious people. Because we

Coyne, J.C., & Gotlib, I.H. (1983). The role of cognition in depression: A

surely are based on failures to intentionally remember. Who knows what

Easterbrook, JA. (1959). The effect of emotion on cue utilization and the

concomitant resolution to try harder? Unless the depressed or anxious person

Edmunson, E.D., & Nelson, D.L. (1976). Anxiety, imagery, and sensory

may merely exacerbate the impairment by providing more salient examples of

Ellis, H.C., & Ashbrook, P.W. (1988). Resource-allocation model of the

1984) or by using memory unconsciously (Jacoby & Kelley, 1987) might turn
rarely consider the unconscious effects of past experience, memory complaints

deleterious effects are exerted by beliefs about impaired memory and the
understands specifically how to improve memory, trying harder to remember

failure that increase anxiety and depression.
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